This is actually more reasonable that one might have come to expect from the weekly "Death to America" rallies (which, as every knowledgeable person on the area from Juan Cole to Fareed Zakaria has pointed out, is far more of a mob chant; individual Iranians are mostly pro-American).
Of course, Iranian funding of Hamas and Hezbollah terrorism has to cease, and might actually be a better place to focus on than nuclear empowerment for now. The two groups are not likely to be snuffed out, but they probably can be steered toward a Sinn Fein type of political compromise, which will not satisfy past victims, but will help prevent future ones.
Some of this is generational also, and as some of the old hardliners who still harbor bitter memories of the excesses of the White Revolution die off, normalization of relations can advance. But it's not just about the anti-Zionist rhetoric that Tehran uses to stoke its revolutionary guff, it's the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia are bitter enemies as well, and that even if Tehran tore down the Isfahan nuclear facility tomorrow, planted a nice red-white-and-blue community garden in its place and named it after George Washington, the Saudis would probably calibrate that situation against their own relationship with us.
The Saudis probably wouldn't mind having nukes either, whether or not Iran gets them (they will) and their populace has a much greater anti-American, fundamentalist whackjob undercurrent. So it's more than just the usual tone present in the article, it's that no one really seems to follow that trail of geopolitical relationships all the way through to how dependent our foreign and domestic policies are on that balance.